The Spanish Constitution defines the Senate as 'Chamber of territorial representation'.
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force of an Act, although they are passed by the Government. To remain in force, the Decree-Laws have to be validated by the lower House within 30 days of their promulgation, with the Senate having no role in this process (sec. 86 Const.). The DecreeLaws have become a quite common way to legislate, this alienation being of great significance in the law-making process.
The Senate, on occasions, has powers on equal terms with the Congress. This is the case of the procedure to reform the Constitution, although in the case of disagreement, the lower House can impose its opinion by a qualified majority -sec. 166 and ff. Const.-, the procedure for ratification of international Treaties, when parliamentary authorisation is required -sec. 94 Const.-, control of government activity -sec. 109-111 Const.-, or the appointment of judges to the Constitutional Court -sec. 159 Const. -or to other State organs. But these are exceptions rather than the rule.
Finally, there are decisive issues in the parliamentary system in which the decision corresponds exclusively to Congress, without any Senate intervention whatsoever. This is the case of both the election of the President of the Government (Prime Minister) -sec. 99
Const. -and the demand for Government accountability (vote of confidence -sec. 112-and vote of censure -sec. 113-).
In conclusion, Spain has an imbalanced bicameral parliament, with absolute dominance of the lower Chamber which, with very few exceptions, has the capacity to impose its will in the event of discrepancy between the two Houses, almost immediately, especially in the procedure of drafting laws. Moreover, the second Chamber is completely excluded from what W. Bagehot (1873: 78) regarded as the 'principal business' of a legislature in a parliamentary system: 'making and keeping an executive', although 'it is chosen, in name, to make laws'.
Senate and territorial autonomy: general overview
With regard to the Senate's powers in relation to its definition as 'House of territorial representation' it is significant that, apart from the exception that will be analyzed laterand which, indeed, is the main focus of this work-, the Senate is set to play no significant role, with no power that justifies that condition. 
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First of all, what is most surprising is the Senate's exclusion from effective participation in the determination of the content of the SA, the internal or territorial Constitution of each AC, its 'basic institutional rule', as defined in sec. 147(1) Const. Its participation is merely formal, in the process of final adoption of the SA as Organic Act, but when its contents have already been decided upon. In the Spanish system the SA is not, in the fullest sense, an exercise of the constitutional autonomy of the territory, but is rather a State's Act -as far as it is an Organic Act-, adopted via a complex process, initiated by the parliamentary representatives of the territory, who present their project to the Select Committee on Constitution in the Congreso de los Diputados, where the definitive text is agreed upon between a delegation of the representatives of the territory and the members of the Select Committee. The resulting text is submitted to referendum before the electorate of the territory and, if endorsed, is processed in Parliament (Cortes Generales) for its adoption as Organic Act (Aguado 1996) . The Senate only participates in this final phase, in which the Chambers do no more than formally validate the text, now -at least, politically-unmodifiable.
The Constitution, by contrast, establishes three questions in which the Senate decides in conjunction with Congress, on an equal footing, without being subordinated, as is generally the case. On the one hand, it corresponds to the Cortes Generales, 'by overall majority of the members of each House' to assess the need 'to harmonize the rulemaking provisions of the Self-Governing Communities' to enact what have been called 'harmonization Acts' -sec. 150(3) Const.-. This is, in any case, a type of Act which, following the frustrated attempt by the LOAPA -Organic Act of harmonization on the process of territorial autonomy-, declared substantially unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court regarding the quest to be an 'Act of harmonization' (CC Ruling -CCR-76/1983, of August 5) (Muñoz Machado 1983; Cruz Villalón 1983) , has been practically disabled, without further mention of the possibility of its use.
On the other hand, sec. 158(2) Const. establishes that the Cortes Generales -i.e., both Houses -shall distribute between the ACs and the provinces -'where appropriate'-the financial resources from the fund that will have to be created 'with the aim of redressing inter-territorial economic imbalances and implementing the principle of solidarity'. But this Fund, which seemed to be contemplated in the Constitution as an equalization fund, plays a completely marginal role in the system of distribution of financial resources, while the In the three cases in which the Constitution attributes to the Senate an intervention in parity with Congress vis-à-vis territorial autonomy, these are questions that, at least in practice, have become almost irrelevant. Generally speaking, therefore, one must conclude that the Senate plays no special role with regard to territorial autonomy: it lacks significant specific powers relating to territorial autonomy; it is excluded from the establishment of the contents of the territory's internal Constitution -SA-; and, on the rare occasion when it is assigned participation which is not subordinated to lower House, it is with regard to issues that have been proven irrelevant.
The General Committee on the Autonomous Communities
The parliamentary political forces have attempted to increase the importance of the Senate vis-à-vis territorial autonomy. The most significant initiative in this respect was taken in 1994, with the reform of the Senate Standing Orders VI . This included, most importantly, one question of particular interest in relation to the subject of this work. It incorporated the most significant novelty during these years: the creation in the Senate of a
General Committee on AC -sec. 55-(Visiedo 1997; García-Escudero 1994; Ripollés 1995; Morales et al. 1994) .
With the creation of this General Committee the aim was, on the one hand, to establish within the Senate a Committee that was particularly relevant from the formal point of view, in an attempt to differentiate it from the other Select Committees of the House. Furthermore, the idea was for this Committee to be the catalyst for all reflection and debate on territorial autonomy within Spanish legislature as a whole, for it to be the forum for decisive debates on territorial autonomy, the benchmark for reflections on the latter and the driving force E -245 behind initiatives in this area. And it was a case, finally, in order that all this might be possible, of it not being an exclusively internal Committee within the Chamber, but the scenario in which the representatives of the governments of the ACs, and in particular their respective presidents, could participate in these reflections and in the promotion of the State Parliament's initiatives with regard to territorial autonomy. To facilitate all the above, Senate Standing Orders introduced a significant symbolic novelty: the possibility that interventions taking place in the sessions of the General Committee may be performed in any of the official languages that, along with Castilian, have official status in an AC; interventions that shall be reproduced in the Official Report (Hansard) 'in the language in which they were delivered and in Castilian' -sec. 56. bis (9) The creation of the General Committee on the Autonomous Communities raised hopes in some sectors regarding the prominence that its activity would attribute to the Senate in relation to territorial autonomy. The experience, however, has been largely frustrating.
Although during the initial years, following the creation of that General Committee, such a debate attracted some attention, the similar debate in the Plenary Session has attracted more attention than the former. But even the latter has languished considerably. To the traditional absence of members of the Government of the AC of the Basque Countryand in particular, of its president-, has been added, in recent years, that of the Government of Catalonia, which, without a doubt, has reduced the significance of the debate. But above all it has been the absence of significant impact of the questions raised in the debates and, in general, within the General Committee, which has largely dashed the hopes inspired in some by this initiative (Varela 2006: 149-150) IX . On the other hand, the nationalist partiesBasque and Catalan in particular, but also, in certain parliamentary circumstances, those of the Canary Islands or others-have continued to make very effective use of their votes in the lower Chamber, when the Government majority has required them, meaning that, for these parties, the real House of territorial representation has always been the Congreso de los
Diputados.
One can conclude, therefore, that the Senate is not a House of territorial representation, from neither a structural nor a functional point of view (Punset 2006: 112) .
Federal Coercion and the Senate's Role
In this context of subordination of the Senate to the lower House and of absence of any significant special power vis-à-vis territorial autonomy, one exception stands out, in which the Senate alone decides, without any intervention by the lower House: authorizing the Government to apply measures of 'federal coercion'.
The Spanish Constitution -sec. 155 -regulates this concept in a manner taken directly from sec. 37 of the German Grundgesetz (GG) As the CC has indicated, there is no doubt that the purpose of sec. 155 Const. is to guarantee the unity of the legal system (CCR 25/1981, of 2 July). In the virtually unanimous opinion of scholars, this is an absolutely extraordinary measure, in view of the particular requirements, the precautions established in the Constitution and the enormous political significance of recourse to federal coercion. An extraordinary nature that was apparent in the debate on the drafting of the Constitution and that has been confirmed in the practical functioning of the political system (Vírgala Foruria 2005: 58-9 ). This has also been reiterated by the CC XII . And so it has become consolidated in the political consciousness. The fact that this constitutional provision has never been applied in the 
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Constitution reaffirmed this notion of exceptionality. All this led to the idea that this was a provision intended, fundamentally, not to be applied; or, rather, the use of which was not to be forced. Which was not to deny its usefulness, insofar as its main function was considered to be not so much its practical application as the preventive effect arising from its presence in the Constitution (Ballart 1987: 92) .
That awareness of the exceptional nature of federal coercion, the unknown quality of its application in the prototype-country and the political connotations of its application led to unwillingness to resort to this constitutional provision. Not even on the occasion of repeated disobedience of the CC's decisions by the Catalan authorities with regard to the staging of the referendum (the so-called 'consultation') of 9-N (2014), was there any intention to apply the measures of federal coercion to impose compliance with those legal obligations that were being violated. Although there had been warnings that the development of events would make it very difficult to avoid the application of measures of this kind (López-Basaguren, 2017a: 311), until very shortly before the events surrounding the referendum on self-determination of 1-O and the UDI (2017) the application of measures of federal coercion was regarded as unlikely.
There is significant evidence that the Government sought to avoid their application until the last moment. Although it did so, in my opinion, simply in an attempt to elude its responsibility in the hope that other institutions would assume responsibility for the actions that would render unnecessary the application of federal coercion. If, on the one hand, it appears that the government's majority attempted to 'normalize' in political -and legal- E -250 proved to be an almost complete failure, to date at least XIV , as the CC has not made use of its 'new' powers, in particular the possibility of suspending authorities and civil servants.
The final recourse -too late, in the opinion of many-to 'federal coercion' can only be correctly understood, in my view, if these elements are taken into account.
The Secession Issue in Catalonia: general overview
In order to analyze the practical application of federal coercion and, in this area, the Senate's role, it is necessary to present a general picture of the political process of the claim for secession in Catalonia, insofar as recourse to this instrument has been the State's response to the most recent developments. The characteristics of this work, however, require a synthetic, schematic presentation, in order not to stray from its purpose E -251 independence would not only be a democratically unquestionable objective, but would also, if it enjoyed majority social support, be democratically unassailable. Independence, moreover, would be quickly achieved, majority social support having been established, and would be even attainable in unilateral fashion. And it would be a peaceful and legal process, requiring only that the Catalan Parliament, as custodian of the sovereignty of the people of Catalonia, pass the laws that would 'disconnect' Catalonia from Spain. This is not the place to enter into a debate on an approach such as that employed by the advocates of the secessionist demand. But I think it is clear to any observer minimally removed from the partisan defence of the process that the political and legal bases of this approach reveal highly questionable aspects. The interpretation of the right to selfdetermination does not correspond to its contents as defined by the international organisations with competence in this sphere; and neither does the understanding of the right to self-determination by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Kosovo. The ICJ reiterates over and over again that this right is not what is under consideration -nor whether if in the case of Kosovo this is an instance of remedial secession. A negative answer that is extraordinarily significant, in view of the events preceding that UDI. One is struck by the fact that the authors of the secessionist discourse have not addressed -at least not openly -the two practical problems, the two inescapable challenges to the effectiveness of such a discourse: the capacity effectively to control the territory and sufficient recognition by the international community. It comes as a surprise, above all, because these are two questions that were explicitly indicated by the Supreme Court (SC) of Canada in the Reference on the secession of Quebec (1998) and by the ICJ in the case of Kosovo -much used in the defence of the legitimacy of secession-.
But throughout the process the secessionist movement has faced a far more serious problem: the absence of a majority of Catalan society in support of secession, a simple majority, never mind that 'clear majority as a qualitative evaluation' referred to as indispensable, in any case, by the Canadian SC in the Reference on Quebec secession (para. 87).
In 2010 nationalism had a comfortable majority, with over 1.5 million votes (around 49% of the total) and 76 seats out of 135. The combination of non-nationalist parties accounted for 41.5% of votes -just under 1.3 million -and 59 seats. All this with a low turnout: 58.78%. The secessionist process has slowly but surely transformed this situation. 
The measures of Federal Coercion in Catalonia
Throughout the development of the process of the claims for the secession of At that moment the situation was completely different from that of November 2014.
In October 2017 the Catalan Parliament and Government had formally declared that they would not comply with Spanish legal system (Catalonia, they said, had already been 'disconnected' from Spain), refusing to apply either Spanish legislation or the decisions of its Courts -among them, those of the CC-; both, Parliament and Government had declared that they would apply the Acts of 'disconnection' passed by the Catalan Parliament; these Acts stated that in the event of the referendum producing more votes in favour than against independence -irrespective of the turnout achieved -the Parliament would declare the secession of Catalonia; Parliament and Government played with the UDI, passing and suspending and passing it again XXVII .
The measures proposed by the Government to be adopted in the Senate were multiple, 
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issue is whether the strictly political declarative acts of a representative Chamber, which, not being self-executive, need 'executive' activity to have practical effects, can be a case of refusal to 'fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the Constitution or other laws', as stated by the sec. 155 Const. This could be the case, on the one hand, of the UDI by Parliament, which is a declarative act, and, on the other, the executive acts needed for that declaration to become a reality (Lopez Basaguren 2017a: 314 ff.). In these cases, is control and -if appropriate-its nullification by the Courts -i.e., CC-not sufficient? With regard to the measures adopted, the Consell considers the dissolution of Parliament to be compatible with the Constitution, though it considers that in the prior notification the Central Government should have warned the Government of Catalonia that this dissolution might be one of the measures adopted in the event of non-compliance.
The Consell considers that this measure is covered by sec. 155 Const. insofar as Parliament 'is responsible for passing Acts of referendum on self-determination and on Legal Transience and Foundational of the Republic with the corresponding effects and subsequent acts of undermining of the constitutional order and prevailing statutory law ' (p. 55) . And, at the same time, it thinks that it is the most proportionate and shortest-lasting measure, allowing for rapid re-establishment of institutional normality. On the other hand, 
Final Remarks: the need to reform a useless Senate
The Spanish Senate, despite its constitutional description as 'House of territorial representation', fulfils a function as a Chamber of sober second thought, completely subordinate to the lower House, in which its function with regard to territorial autonomy is in practical terms thoroughly diluted. The absence of a 'territorial' role occurs, even, when the Senate is exclusively responsible for a function linked to territorial autonomy, as is the case of authorisation of measures of 'federal coercion' referred in sec. 155 Const.
Firstly, the composition of the Senate is decisive in this incapacity to play an active role in the channelling of interests related with territorial autonomy. It is not only the fact that E -261 the vast majority of senators are elected upon a provincial basis and this radically distorts the territorial origins of the members vis-à-vis the relative demographic weight of the different ACs and also distorts the political orientation of this Chamber. It is also the fact that, as a consequence of the electoral system and the absolute power of the leadership of the parties in the designation of -or support for-candidates, the members of the Chamber respond, absolutely, to a dynamic of party rather than territorial interests. Moreover, finally, nobody, neither parties nor ACs, has ever felt the need to channel their territorial interests via the upper House. It is in the lower House that the interests of the ACs are channelled. This is evident in the cases where the AC is governed by one of the two major parties that have alternated in Government; as it is in the cases of the nationalist parties -the Basque and Catalan cases are the most significant -or by regionalist parties, regardless of whether or not they control the Government of the AC, although their viability is conditioned by political context and parliamentary arithmetic. It is extremely difficult for a Chamber constituted thus and accustomed to functioning in a manner subordinate to the political dominance of the lower House, with the members of the Senate having an absolutely secondary role, to be able to act according to territorial interests when it has to exercise a function within the sphere of territorial autonomy, even if it enjoys exclusive competence. The experience of the General Committee on AC is very significant in this respect.
On the other hand, the attempt to reinforce in the upper House activity, debate and proposals in questions of territorial autonomy soon petered out, after the initial impact arising from the novelty of the initiative. The functioning of the party system has not changed and the parties have not assigned the General Committee on AC the leading role regarding territorial autonomy. The same conclusion can be drawn from the extraordinary procedure to authorise the measures of coercion proposed by the Government, under sec. In any case, what the present system has shown is that without significantly altering the Senators' provenance and without transforming the Senate's powers within the parliamentary system, any attempt to assign it a leading role in relation to territorial autonomy appears to be almost inevitably doomed to failure.
 Professor of Constitutional Law. University of the Basque Country -UPV/EHU-(Spain). Email: alberto.lopez@ehu.eus. University's Research Group PPGA18/12. This paper has been written as a contribution to the Research Project DER 2017-86988-P, funded by the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO) -now, Ministry of Science, Competitiveness and Universities-. I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers who evaluated this paper for their helpful comments regarding a previous draft. I There is obviously a considerable amount of academic literature in Spanish on the subject of the Senate. In English, the most complete work is that of Castellà 2013. II Spain is divided into 50 provinces. However, for the purposes of the election of Senators, under sec. 69 (3) of the Constitution, the island provinces appoint 'three Senators for each of the major islands -Gran Canaria, Mallorca and Tenerife-and one for each of the following islands or groups of islands: Ibiza-Formentera, Menorca, Fuerteventura, Gomera, Hierro, Lanzarote and La Palma.' In addition, 'the cities of Ceuta and Melilla shall elect two Senators each.' III In any case, of the 17 ACs in Spain, seven were formed on the basis of a single Province: Asturias, Cantabria, Navarra, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia and the unique case of the Balearic Islands. IV This is what explains the political majorities that usually exist in the Senate. The current legislature is a good example. While the lower Chamber has witnessed a significant diversification of representation, with the traditional two-party system significantly weakened, complemented by the existence of significant territorially localised -nationalist-minorities, in the Senate the conservative PP -the party in Government until the vote of no confidence of June, 1-retains a comfortable overall majority -148 seats-, followed, at some distance, by the Socialist Party -62 seats-, with a very minority representation of the other parties: 20 seats Podemos, 12 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 6 the PNV -Basque nationalists-, 6 the PdCAT -former Convergència, Catalan nationalists-and 12 other small parties. V The Organic Act is a type of reinforced Act, reserved for the regulation of the development of fundamental rights, the electoral system, the SA and, in general, the regulation of the constitutional institutions of the State (sec. 81 Const.). To date, it has met on six occasions (2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012, and 2017) . X In any case, it was argued at the time (García de Enterría 1983: 163 ff.) that sec. 155 was not a simple transfer of 'federal coercion' (Bundeszwang) from sec. 37 GG, but an amalgam of that provision and of the 'federal oversight' (Bundesaufsicht) of sec. 84 GG. Upon this basis, the prestigious jurist was attempting to 'de-dramatize' the interpretation of the constitutional provision, defending its 'ordinary' nature as an instrument of relationship between the State and the AC, at least in the execution of State legislation by the autonomous territories. In this sense, he differentiated between what he called the 'declarative stage' (federal oversight) and the 'enforcement phase' (federal coercion). The 'declarative stage' was what was activated in 1989 against the AC of the Canary Islands, when its Government refused to apply the elimination of its territory's import tariffs, provoking a conflict with the EU and with the Spanish Government. Negotiations between both Governments led to an agreement that all parties regarded as satisfactory. XI A different matter is the adoption of purely 'political' measures like the declaration of 'extraordinary', situations such as 'states of emergency and siege (martial law)', regulated in sec. 55(1) and 116 of the Constitution. XII In this sense, the CC has said more than once that sec. 155 establishes an 'extraordinary tool': CCR 6/1982 of 22 February ('an extraordinary control'); CCR 49/1988 of 22 March ('an extraordinary means of obligation, not appropriate for the resolution of common matters'); CCR 215/2014 of 18 December ('a last reaction against a flagrant breach of obligations imposed by the Constitution'). XIII The term 'ordinary' legislation is used in counter-position to 'constitutional'. This is the case of the Act on Budgetary Stability -Organic Act 2/2012, of April 27-, under which non-compliance by the AC with the consequences arising from non-compliance with objectives of budgetary stability and of the economic-financial plan will allow the Government to apply the measures provided for in sec. 155 Const. in order to force compulsory compliance (sec. 26). This is an unnecessary provision, since it does no more than reproduce what is established in sec. 155 Const. But it made it possible to introduce federal coercion into 'ordinary' legal language. XIV With regard to the secessionist process in Catalonia, the CC has not applied these new instruments attributed to it by the law. It seems relevant that no Catalan authority was suspended despite the clear defiance of the CC's decisions regarding the referendum of 1-O; and that only in relation to that referendum did it impose periodic penalty fines upon the members of the Electoral Commission (Sindicatura electoral), whose task was to supervise the referendum process and to announce the results. The CC's decision resulted in the immediate withdrawal of XVI Although there are conflicting interpretations with regard to its impact upon the beginning of the process, at least indirectly, in its origin is the frustrating conclusion to the process of reform of the SA of Catalonia (2006), the final milestone being the CC ruling (CCR 31/2010, of June 28) declaring contrary to the Constitution -and, consequently, null and void-twelve clauses in different articles of the SA, establishing, in addition, how different clauses in another twenty-seven articles had to be understood to be consistent with the Constitution. The bibliography upon the reform of the SA of Catalonia and on the corresponding CCR is extensive in Spanish and Catalan. In English, see López-Basaguren 2013: 400 ff.
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The reports of the Consell assessor per a la transició nacional are accessible at https://www.ara.cat/politica/informe-consell-assessor-transicio-nacional_0_1120088191.html; the official website of the Generalitat of Catalonia only has the last eight reports of the Consell (http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres_fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/274452/ca/catn-conclou-independenciasuposaria-guany-fiscal-d11-600m-deuros-i-garanteix-viabilitat-pensions.do). XVIII In this sense, immediately after the elections of September 2015, M. Keating (2015) stated, in relation to the first of the pro-independence options (unilaterally declare independence): 'Prominent members of the civil society pro-independence movements have long advocated this. Yet, without a majority of the popular vote, this looks democratically dubious. It is also formidably difficult as a practical matter, as it would require international recognition and the loyalty of citizens to the new state.' XIX In this process there has been another highly significant event: the profound internal transformation of each of the political sectors configured in relation to the question of independence, with the strengthening in each of them of the political forces occupying a more radical position in favour of or against independence. But this is neither the time nor the place to analyse this question. XX Until very recently, the most significant figures in Catalan society who appeared and spoke in public in relation to the political process did so in support of the demand for independence. XXI See the considerations of the experienced former editor of The Guardian P. Preston (2017b). XXII Indeed, 'The dignity of Catalonia' was the title of the joint editorial of the Catalan press as a whole published on November 26, 2009, on the CC ruling on the reform of the SA, that was still being drafted, over three years after the appeal was lodged-. XXIII One of the favourite -and most effective-arguments employed by the secessionists is that it is easier to achieve the independence of Catalonia than it is to reform the -constitutional -system of territorial autonomy. The answer to that conviction comes, however, via the very history of Catalonia, in relation to the proclamation of the Catalan Republic on October 6, 1934, during the Spanish Second Republic, from one of the sharpest observers of those events, A. Calvet, Gaziel (2013, 135) at that time editor of the newspaper La Vanguardia: 'The separatist believes that it is impossible to get along with the rest of the Spaniards, and to resolve this situation, proposes something even more difficult, which is violently to part with them. He feels incapable of making the necessary effort in order to exert influence in Spain, and dreams instead of the mighty objective of breaking free once and for all from its formidable influence. To escape one difficulty he creates a greater one. But if he lacks the strength to resolve the smaller problem, how is he going to deal with the bigger one?' XXIV Both were, finally, declared null and void, as contrary to the Constitution: CCR 31 and 32/2015, of February 21. XXV The procedure, moreover, prevented opposition groups from requesting a report from the Consell de Garanties Estatutaries. This organ recalled that the right to request the Opinion upon the presentation of a Bill is a fundamental right of the members of Parliament: see CONSELL DE GARANTIES ESTATUTÀRIES: Acord del Ple del Consell de Garanties Estatutàries, of September 6, 2017 and Acord del Ple del Consell de Garanties Estatutàries, of September 7, 2017 . The CC resolved the appeal via Ruling 139/2017, of November 29, in which it considers that the reform of article 135 of the Regulation is constitutional insofar as it is interpreted solely in the sense that it allows for the presentation of partial or total amendments to the Bill by the parliamentary groups. XXVI 
